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Abstract
We propose a non-standard semantics for Alternating-time Temporal Logic with
incomplete information, for which no commonly accepted semantics has been pro-
posed yet. In our semantics, formulae are interpreted over sets of states rather than
single states. We also propose a new epistemic operator for “practical” or “con-
structive” knowledge, and we show that the new language is strictly more expres-
sive than existing solutions, while it retains the same model checking complexity.
Finally, we study properties of constructive knowledge and other operators in a
non-standard semantics like this.
Keywords: Alternating-time Temporal Logic, strategic ability, incomplete infor-
mation, epistemic logic.
1 Introduction
Modal logics of strategic ability [1, 3, 16, 17] form one of the fields where logic and
game theory can successfully meet. The logics have clear possible worlds semantics,
are axiomatizable, and have some interesting computational properties. Moreover, they
are underpinned by a clear and intuitively appealing conceptual machinery for modeling
and reasoning about systems that involve multiple autonomous agents. The basic no-
tions, used here, originate from temporal logic (i.e., the logic of time and computation),
and classical game theory [25, 14, 15], which emerged in an attempt to give precise
meaning to common-sense notions like choices, strategies, or rationality – and to pro-
vide formal models of interaction between autonomous entities, that could be used in
further study. Thus, the notions and models were meant to describe real-life phenom-
ena that occur in communities of individual and collective agents (e.g., companies). Of
course, the treatment of interaction, given by von Neumann, Morgenstern and Nash,
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is oversimplistic, and its fundamental philosophical merit has also been questioned.1
One may even argue whether modeling of intelligent agents and their interaction can be
done with the tools of mathematics and formal logic at all [26, 18]. However, having
a formal model of a problem makes one realize many (otherwise implicit) assumptions
underlying his or her approach to this problem. Modal logics that embody basic game
theory notions – and at the same time build upon branching-time temporal logics, well
known and studied in the context of computational systems – seem a good starting point
for investigating multi-agent systems.
Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) [1, 2, 3], is probably the most important
logic of strategic ability that has emerged in the recent years. However, ATL consid-
ers only agents that possess perfect information about the current state of the world,
and such agents seldom exist in reality. On the other hand, incomplete information
and knowledge are addressed in epistemic logic in a natural way. A combination
of ATL and epistemic logic, called Alternating-time Temporal Epistemic Logic (ATEL),
was introduced in [22, 23] to enable reasoning about agents acting under incomplete
information. Still, it has been pointed out in several places that the meaning of ATEL
formulae is somewhat counterintuitive. Most importantly, an agent’s ability to achieve
property ϕ should imply that the agent has enough control and knowledge to identify
and execute a strategy that enforces ϕ. A number of ATEL updates were proposed to
overcome this problem, yet none of them seems the ultimate definitive solution. Most
of the solutions agree that only uniform strategies are really executable. However, in
order to identify a successful strategy, the agents must consider not only the courses
of action, starting from the current state of the system, but also from states that are
indistinguishable from the current one. There are many cases here, especially when
group epistemics is concerned: the agents may have common, ordinary or distributed
knowledge about a strategy being successful, or they may be hinted the right strategy by
a distinguished member (the “boss”), a subgroup (“headquarters committee”) or even
another group of agents (“consulting company”) etc. In other words, there are many
subtle cases as for which states might be considered as the (possible) initial situations.
In this paper, we propose a non-standard semantics for the logic of strategic ability
and incomplete information. In the semantics, formulae are interpreted over sets of
states rather than single states. This reflects the intuition that the “constructive” ability
to enforceϕmeans that the agents in question have a single strategy that brings about ϕ
for all possible initial situations – and not that a successful strategy exists for each initial
situation (because those could be different strategies for different situations). To do it in
a flexible and general way, the type of the satisfaction relation in our proposal forces one
to specify the set of initial states explicitly. In consequence, we write M,Q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕ to
express the fact that A must have a strategy which is successful for all states in Q. We
also propose a new epistemic operator for “practical” or “constructive” knowledge that
yields the set of states for which a single evidence (i.e., a successful strategy) should
1Consider this quote from [21]: “Rational Behavior [is]: greed, modified by sloth, constrained by formless
fear and justified ex post by rationalization.”
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be presented (instead of checking if the required property holds in each of the states
separately, like standard epistemic operators do). We point out that this new operator
captures the notion of knowing “de re”, while the standard epistemic operators refer to
knowing “de dicto”.
We begin with a short presentation of Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) and the
attempts that have been made to extend ATL to scenarios with incomplete information.
Then we present the main contribution of this paper: a new, non-standard semantics for
the logic of ability, incomplete information and knowledge. We show that it is strictly
more expressive than the existing solutions (with the possible exception of ETSL), while
it retains the same model checking complexity. Furthermore, we observe that the clas-
sical definition of negation does not seem suitable for reasoning about non-strategic
properties in such a semantics. To overcome this, we propose a new negation opera-
tor (which we call “strong” or “constructive” negation); we also point out that strong
negation can be used to define standard knowledge in terms of constructive knowledge.
Finally, we study the properties of constructive knowledge itself. It turns out that, out of
the S5 properties, axioms K,D,4,5 (but not T!) hold with classical negation (and impli-
cation), while only axioms 4,5 hold under constructive negation. However, we observe
that a weak negation or a conjunction immediately following a constructive knowledge
operator do not have a distinct meaning. Thus, we can restrict the language, exclud-
ing such formulae without losing expressive power — and if we do then the T axiom
schema becomes valid for both classical and strong negation.
2 What Agents Can Achieve
ATL [1, 2, 3] was invented to capture properties of open computer systems (such as
computer networks), where different components can act autonomously, and computa-
tions in such systems are effected by their combined actions. Alternatively, ATL can be
seen as a logic for systems involving multiple agents, that allows one to reason about
what agents can achieve in game-like scenarios. As ATL does not include incomplete
information in its scope, it can be seen as a logic for reasoning about agents who always
have complete information about the current state of affairs.
2.1 ATL: Ability in Perfect Information Games
ATL can be understood as a generalization of the branching time temporal logic CTL [4],
in which path quantifiers are replaced with so called cooperation modalities. Formula
〈〈A〉〉ϕ, where A is a coalition of agents, expresses that A have a collective strategy to
enforce ϕ. ATL formulae include temporal operators: “
5
” (“in the next state”),
0
(“always from now on”) and U (“until”). Operator
&
(“now or sometime in the fu-
ture”) can be defined as
&
ϕ ≡ ⊤Uϕ. Like in CTL, every occurrence of a temporal
operator is preceded by exactly one cooperation modality. Example ATL properties
are: 〈〈jamesbond〉〉
&
win (James Bond has an infallible plan to eventually win) and
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〈〈jamesbond, bondsgirl〉〉funUshot-at (Bond and his current girlfriend have a collective
way of having fun until someone shoots at them).
A number of semantics have been defined for ATL, most of them equivalent [5, 6]. In
this paper, we use a variant of concurrent game structures, which includes a nonempty
finite set of all agents Agt = {a1, ..., ak}, a nonempty set of states St, a set of atomic
propositions Π, a valuation of propositions pi : St → P(Π), and the set of (atomic)
actions Act. Function d : Agt × St → P(Act) defines actions available to an agent
in a state, and o is a (deterministic) transition function that assigns the outcome state
q′ = o(q, α1, . . . , αk) to state q and a tuple of actions 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 that can be executed
by Agt in q. A strategy of agent a is a conditional plan that specifies what a is going to
do for every possible situation (sa : St → Act such that sa(q) ∈ da(q)).2 A collective
strategy SA for a group of agents A is a tuple of strategies, one per agent from A. A path
Λ in M is an infinite sequence of states that can be effected by subsequent transitions,
and refers to a possible course of action (or a possible computation) that may occur in
the system; by Λ[i], we denote the ith position on path Λ. Function out(q, SA) returns
the set of all paths that may result from agents A executing strategy SA from state q
onward.
out(q, SA) = {λ = q0q1q2... | q0 = q and for every i = 1, 2, ... there exists a tuple of
agents’ decisions 〈αi−1a1 , ..., α
i−1
ak
〉 such that αi−1a = SA(a)(qi−1) for each a ∈ A,
αi−1a ∈ d(a, qi−1) for each a /∈ A, and o(qi−1, αi−1a1 , ..., α
i−1
ak ) = qi}.
Now, the semantics of ATL formulae can be given via the following clauses:
M, q |= p iff p ∈ pi(q) (where p ∈ Π);
M, q |= ¬ϕ iff M, q 6|= ϕ;
M, q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, q |= ϕ and M, q |= ψ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉
5
ϕ iff there is a collective strategy SA such that, for every Λ ∈
out(q, SA), we have M,Λ[1] |= ϕ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉
0
ϕ iff there exists SA such that, for every Λ ∈ out(q, SA), we have
M,Λ[i] for every i ≥ 0;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕUψ iff there exists SA such that for every Λ ∈ out(q, SA) there is
i ≥ 0, for which M,Λ[i] |= ψ, and M,Λ[j] |= ϕ for every 0 ≤ j < i.
The complexity of ATL model checking is linear in the number of transitions in the
model and the length of the formula [3].
2This is a deviation from the original semantics of ATL [2, 3], where strategies assign agents’ choices
to sequences of states, which suggests that agents can recall the whole history of each game. It should be
pointed out, however, that both types of strategies yield equivalent semantics for ATL [20]. The reason why
we use “memoryless” strategies here is that, under incomplete information, model checking strategic abilities
of agents with perfect recall becomes undecidable (cf. Section 2.2.7).
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2.2 Strategic Ability and Incomplete Information
ATL is unrealistic in a sense: real-life agents seldom possess complete information
about the current state of the world. On the other hand, incomplete information and
knowledge are handled in epistemic logic in a natural way. A combination of ATL
and epistemic logic, called Alternating-time Temporal Epistemic Logic (ATEL), was
introduced in [22, 23] in order to enable reasoning about agents acting under incomplete
information.
2.2.1 ATL with Epistemic Logic.
ATEL [22, 23] enriches the picture with epistemic component, adding to ATL operators
for representing agents’ knowledge: Kaϕ reads as “agent a knows that ϕ”. Additional
operators EAϕ, CAϕ, and DAϕ refer to “everybody knows”, common knowledge, and
distributed knowledge among the agents from A. Thus, EAϕ means that every agent in
A knows that ϕ holds, while CAϕ means not only that the agents from A know that ϕ,
but they also know that they know it, and know that they know that they know it, etc.
The distributed knowledge modality DAϕ expresses that, if the agents could share their
individual knowledge, they would be able to infer ϕ.
Models for ATEL extend concurrent game structures with epistemic accessibility re-
lations ∼1, ...,∼k⊆ Q× Q (one per agent) for modeling agents’ uncertainty.3 We will
call such models concurrent epistemic game structures (CEGS) in the rest of the paper.
Agent a’s epistemic relation is meant to encode a’s inability to distinguish between the
(global) system states: q ∼a q′ means that, while the system is in state q, agent a cannot
determine whether it is in q or q′. Then:
M, q |= Kaϕ iff ϕ holds for every q′ such that q ∼a q′.
Relations ∼EA, ∼CA and ∼DA , used to model group epistemics, are derived from the
individual relations of agents from A. First, ∼EA is the union of relations ∼a, a ∈ A.
Next, ∼CA is defined as the transitive closure of ∼EA. Finally, ∼DA is the intersection of
all the ∼a, a ∈ A. The semantics of group knowledge can be defined as below (for
K = C,E,D):
M, q |= KAϕ iff ϕ holds for every q′ such that q ∼KA q′.
Example 1 (Gambling robots) Two robots (a and b) play a simple card game.
The deck consists of Ace, King and Queen (A,K,Q); it is assumed that A beats K, K
beats Q, but Q beats A. First, the “environment” agent deals a random card to both
robots (face down), so that each player can see his own hand, but he does not know the
card of the other player. Then robot a can exchange his card for the one remaining in
the deck (action exch), or he can keep the current one (keep). At the same time, robot b
can change the priorities of the cards, so that A becomes better than Q (action chg) or
3The relations are assumed to be equivalences.
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Figure 1: Gambling Robots game
he can do nothing (nop). If a has a better card than b after that, then a win is scored,
otherwise the game ends in a “losing” state. A CEGS for the game is shown in Figure 1.
Note that q0 |= 〈〈a〉〉&win, although, intuitively, a has no feasible way of ensuring a
win. This is a fundamental problem with ATEL, which we discuss briefly below.
2.2.2 Problems with ATEL.
It has been pointed out in several places that the meaning of ATEL formulae is somewhat
counterintuitive [7, 9, 11]. Most importantly, one would expect that an agent’s ability
to achieve property ϕ should imply that the agent has enough control and knowledge
to identify and execute a strategy that enforces ϕ (cf. also [20]). ATEL adds to ATL
the vocabulary of epistemic logic; still, in ATEL the strategic and epistemic layers are
combined as if they were independent. They should be – if we do not ask whether the
agents in question are able to identify and execute their strategies. They should not if
we want to interpret strategies as executable plans, about which the agents know that
they guarantee achieving the goal.
Moreover, agents in ATEL are assumed some epistemic capabilities when making
decisions, and other for epistemic properties like Kaϕ. The interpretation of knowledge
operators refers to the agents’ capability to distinguish one state from another; the se-
mantics of 〈〈A〉〉 allows the agents to base their decisions upon histories, i.e. sequences
of states. These tensions between complete vs. incomplete information on one hand,
and perfect vs. imperfect recall on the other, has been studied in [9]. It was argued that,
when reasoning about what an agent can enforce, it seems more appropriate to require
the agent to know his winning strategy rather than to know only that such a strategy
exists. This problem is closely related to the distinction between knowledge de re and
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knowledge de dicto, well known in the philosophy of language [19], as well as research
on the interaction between knowledge and action [12, 13, 27]. Several variations on
“ATL with incomplete information” have been proposed, yet none of them seems the
ultimate definitive solution. We summarize the most important proposals below.
2.2.3 ATLir.
The logic of ATLir [20] includes the same formulae as ATL, only the cooperation
modalities are presented with a subscript: 〈〈A〉〉ir to indicate that they address agents
with imperfect information and imperfect recall. Agents are assumed to know their
actions, so they must have the same choices in indistinguishable states: if q ∼a q′
then d(a, q) = d(a, q′). As a consequence of imperfect recall, agents use memoryless
strategies (sa : St → Act such that sa(q) ∈ da(q)). As a consequence of imperfect
information, they are required to use uniform strategies, i.e. ones that specify the same
choices in indistinguishable states (if q ∼a q′ then sa(q) = sa(q′)). In other words,
agents make choices with respect to their local (epistemic) states rather than global
states of the system. Speaking a bit informally, formula 〈〈A〉〉irϕ holds in M, q iff there
is a uniform collective strategy SA such that, for every a ∈ A, q′ such that q ∼a q′, and
path Λ ∈ out(q′, SA), we have that ϕ is true for Λ. In other words, there is a strategy
such that everybody in A knows that executing this strategy will bring about ϕ. Note
that it is not possible to express that A have common knowledge about the successful
strategy, or that they are able to identify it if they share their knowledge etc.
Example 2 Coming back to our gambling robots, it is easy to see that q0 |= ¬〈〈a〉〉ir&win,
because, for every a’s (uniform) strategy, if it guarantees a win in e.g. state qAK then it
fails in qAQ (and similarly for other pairs of indistinguishable states). Let us also ob-
serve that q0 |= ¬〈〈a, b〉〉ir&win (in order to win, a must keep his card in state qAK , so he
must keep his card in qAQ by uniformity and b must play chg in consequence, etc... and,
finally, a must play keep in qQK , but that leads to the losing state). On the other hand,
qAQ |= 〈〈a, b〉〉ir5win (winning strategy: sa(qAK) = sa(qAQ) = keep, sa(qKQ) = exch,
sb(qAQ) = sb(qKQ) = sb(qAK) = chg; qAK, qAQ, qQK are the states that must be consid-
ered by a and b in qAQ). Still, qAK |= ¬〈〈a, b〉〉ir5win.
2.2.4 ATOL.
Alternating-time Observational Temporal Logic (ATOL), proposed independently in [9],
follows the same perspective as ATLir. However, it includes also epistemic modalities in
the object language (like ATEL), and it offers a richer language of strategic operators to
express subtle differences between various kinds of collective abilities of teams. In this
paper, we use the notation proposed in [10]. The informal meaning of 〈〈A〉〉K(Γ)ϕ is:
“group A has a (memoryless uniform) strategy to enforce ϕ, and agents Γ can identify
the strategy as successful for A in the epistemic sense K”. That is, M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉K(Γ)ϕ
iff there is SA for every a ∈ A, q′ such that q ∼KΓ q′, and path Λ ∈ out(q′, SA), we have
that ϕ is true for Λ.
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Example 3 Re-writing the properties from Example 2, we get: q0 |= ¬〈〈a〉〉K(a)&win,
q0 |= ¬〈〈a, b〉〉E({a,b})&win, qAQ |= 〈〈a, b〉〉E({a,b})5win, and qAK |= ¬〈〈a, b〉〉E({a,b})5win.
Moreover, ATOL allows to express subtler ways of identifying a winning strategy: we
have that qAQ |= 〈〈a, b〉〉D({a,b})5win ∧ 〈〈a, b〉〉K(a)5win (the robots can identify the
strategy if they share knowledge; also, a can be the “boss” who points out the strat-
egy), and qAK |= ¬〈〈a, b〉〉C({a,b})5win (despite all of them knowing the winning strat-
egy, they do not have common knowledge about it).
Proposition 1 [20, 8, 9] Model checking ATLir and ATOL is NP-complete in the size
of the model and the formula.
2.2.5 Feasible ATEL.
“Feasible ATEL” [11] is an update of ATEL, in which the “perfect information” coop-







Ma , that represent agents’ ability to find a suitable uni-
form strategy. These new modalities are very similar to the ones of ATOL. The NP-
completeness result carries over to “Feasible ATEL” (it subsumes ATLir and can be seen
as a subset of ATOL).
2.2.6 Epistemic Temporal Strategic Logic.
ETSL [24] digs deeper in the repository of game theory, and focuses on the concept
of undominated strategies. In a way, 〈〈A〉〉ϕ in ETSL can be summarized as: “if A
play rationally to achieve ϕ (meaning: they never play a dominated strategy), they will
achieve ϕ”. This variant of cooperation modalities has a different flavour than the ones
from ATL, ATEL, ATOL etc.; we do not discuss it further here.
2.2.7 Agents with Perfect Recall: ATLiR and ATEL-R*.
In the original formulation of ATL, agents were assumed to have perfect recall of the
game, in the sense that they could base their decisions on sequences of states rather than
single states. As agents seldom have unlimited memory, and logics of strategic ability
with incomplete information and perfect recall are believed to have undecidable model
checking [20], we do not investigate this variant of ability here.
3 New Semantics for Ability and Knowledge
ATOL covers more cases than ATLir and “Feasible ATEL”, and it is not committed to
any notion of rationality (unlike ETSL). One major drawback of ATOL is that it vastly
increases the number of modal operators necessary to express properties of agents. For
team A, a whole family of cooperation modalities 〈〈A〉〉K(Γ) is used (instead of a single
modality 〈〈A〉〉 in ATL) to specify who should identify the right strategy for A, in what
INSTITUT FÜR INFORMATIK
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way etc. It would be much more elegant to modify the semantics of “simple” coop-
eration modalities 〈〈A〉〉 and/or epistemic operators, so that they can be composed into
sufficiently expressive formulae. The problem with strategic ability under uncertainty
is that, when analyzing consequences of their strategies, agents must consider also the
outcome paths starting from states other than the current state – namely, all states that
look the same as the current state. Thus, a property of a strategy being successful with
respect to goal ϕ is not local to the current state; the same strategy must be successful in
all “opening” states being considered. In order to capture this feature of strategic ability
under incomplete information, we change the type of the satisfaction relation |=, and
define what it means for a formula ϕ to be satisfied in a set of states Q ⊆ St of model
M. To our best knowledge, nobody has used this kind of semantics yet.
Moreover, we extend the language of ATEL with unary “constructive knowledge”
operators Ka, one for each agent a, that yield the set of states, indistinguishable from the
current state from a’s perspective. Constructive common, “everybody’s” and distributed
knowledge is formalized via operators CA,EA, and DA.
3.1 Language and Semantics
The language includes atomic propositions, Boolean connectives, strategic formulae,
standard epistemic operators, and constructive knowledge operators:




ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕUϕ | CAϕ | EAϕ | DAϕ | CAϕ |
EAϕ | DAϕ.
The models are concurrent epistemic game structures again, and we consider only
memoryless uniform strategies. Now, we define the notion of a formula ϕ being satis-
fied by a set of states Q in a model M, written M,Q |= ϕ. We will also write M, q |= ϕ
as a shorthand for M, {q} |= ϕ. Note that this is the latter notion of satisfaction (in sin-
gle states) that we will ultimately be interested in – but that notion is defined in terms
of the (more general) satisfaction in sets of states. Let img(q,R) be the image of state
q with respect to relation R, i.e. the set of all states q′ such that qRq′. Moreover, we
use out(Q, SA) as a shorthand for ∪q∈Qout(q, SA), and img(Q,R) as a shorthand for
∪q∈Qimg(q,R). The new semantics is given through the following clauses.
M,Q |= p iff p ∈ pi(q) for every q ∈ Q;
M,Q |= ¬ϕ iff M,Q 6|= ϕ;
M,Q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M,Q |= ϕ and M,Q |= ψ;
M,Q |= 〈〈A〉〉
5
ϕ iff there exists SA such that, for every Λ ∈ out(Q, SA), we have
that M, {Λ[1]} |= ϕ;
M,Q |= 〈〈A〉〉
0
ϕ iff there exists SA such that, for every Λ ∈ out(Q, SA) and i ≥ 0,
we have M, {Λ[i]} |= ϕ;
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M,Q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕUψ iff there exists SA such that, for every Λ ∈ out(Q, SA), there is
i ≥ 0 for which M, {Λ[i]} |= ψ and M, {Λ[j]} |= ϕ for every 0 ≤ j < i.
M,Q |= KAϕ iff M, q |= ϕ for every q ∈ img(Q,∼KA ) (where K = C,E,D).
M,Q |= KˆAϕ iff M, img(Q,∼KA ) |= ϕ (where Kˆ = C,E,D and K = C,E,D,
respectively).
Individual knowledge operators can be derived as: Kaϕ ≡ C{a}ϕ and Kaϕ ≡ C{a}ϕ.
Moreover, we define ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ≡ ¬(¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2), and ϕ1 → ϕ2 ≡ ¬ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2. It
should be noted that there are many other possibilities for defining negation, disjunction
and implication, corresponding to the different ways of quantifying over the set Q.
We henceforth call ¬ weak negation. Another notion of negation is introduced and
discussed in Section 4.
The satisfaction relation |= gives us both the traditional notion of satisfaction in a
state, and the more general notion of satisfaction in a set of states. As mentioned above,
we are usually interested in the former. We say that a formula is weakly valid (or simply
valid) if it is satisfied by all states in all models, i.e. if M, q |= ϕ for all models M and
states q in M. It is strongly valid if it is satisfied by all sets in all models; i.e. if for
each M and every set of states Q it is the case that M,Q |= ϕ. Strong validity implies
validity.
3.2 Expressing Agents’ Strategic Abilities
The reason why we need to interpret formulae over sets of states is that we need non-
standard epistemic operators: M, q |= Ka〈〈a〉〉ϕ expresses the fact that a has a single
strategy that enforces ϕ from all states indiscernible from q, instead of stating that ϕ
can be achieved from every such state separately. Note that the latter property is very
much in the spirit of standard epistemic logic, and indeed can be captured with the
standard knowledge operator (via Ka〈〈a〉〉ϕ). More generally, the first kind of formulae
refers to having a strategy “de re” (i.e. having a successful strategy and knowing the
strategy), while the latter refers to having a strategy “de dicto” (i.e. only knowing that
some successful strategy is available; cf. [9]). Note also that the property of having a
winning strategy for the current state (but not necessarily even knowing about it) is sim-
ply expressed with 〈〈a〉〉ϕ. Capturing different ability levels of coalitions is analogous,
with various “epistemic modes” of collective recognizing the right strategy.
Example 4 Robot a has no winning strategy in the starting state of the game: q0 |=
¬〈〈a〉〉
&
win, which implies that he has neither a strategy “de re” nor “de dicto” (q0 |=
¬Ka〈〈a〉〉&win∧¬Ka〈〈a〉〉&win). On the other hand, he has a successful strategy in qAK
(just play keep) and he knows he has one (because another action, exch, is bound to win
in qAQ); still, the knowledge is not constructive, since a does not know which strategy is
the right one in the current situation: qAK |= 〈〈a〉〉5win∧Ka〈〈a〉〉5win∧¬Ka〈〈a〉〉5win.
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Other properties of the gambling robots, that we presented in Examples 2 and 3,
can be easily expressed in the new logic by combining constructive knowledge with
cooperation modalities: q0 |= ¬E{a,b}〈〈a, b〉〉&win, qAQ |= E{a,b}〈〈a, b〉〉5win, qAQ |=
D{a,b}〈〈a, b〉〉5win∧Ka〈〈a, b〉〉5win, qAK |= C{a,b}〈〈a, b〉〉5win∧¬C{a,b}〈〈a, b〉〉5win
etc. In the following proposition, we point out that the new logic is expressive enough
to embed the previous solutions, and we present a translation.
Theorem 2 Let ϕ be a formula of ATLir, ATOL or “Feasible ATEL”, and let tr be as
follows:
tr(p) = p tr(¬ϕ) = ¬tr(ϕ)









tr(ϕ) tr(ϕUψ) = tr(ϕ)U tr(ψ)
tr(〈〈A〉〉irϕ) = EA〈〈A〉〉ϕ tr(〈〈A〉〉K(Γ)ϕ) = KˆΓ〈〈A〉〉ϕ
tr(〈〈A〉〉fϕ) = 〈〈A〉〉ϕ tr(〈〈A〉〉fKϕ) = KˆA〈〈A〉〉ϕ




where K = C,E,D and Kˆ = C,E,D, respectively. Then:
M, q |= ϕ iff M, q |= tr(ϕ).
Proof. (Structural induction wrt the structure of ϕ)
• M, q |= tr(p) iff M, q |= p.
• M, q |= tr(¬ϕ) iff M, q 6|= tr(ϕ) iff (by induction) M, q 6|= ϕ iff M, q |= ¬ϕ.
[Similarly for ϕ ∧ ψ.]





),SA)M,Λ[1] |= tr(ϕ) iff (by induction)
∃SA∀Λ∈out(img(q,∼E
Γ
),SA)M,Λ[1] |= ϕ iff M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉E(Γ)5ϕ. [Similarly for co-
operation modalities with other temporal operators (
0
, U) and epistemic modes
(K,C,D etc.).]
• M, q |= tr(KAϕ) iff M, q |= KAtr(ϕ) iff ∀q′∈img(q,∼KA )M, q
′ |= tr(ϕ) iff (by
induction) ∀q′∈img(q,∼KA )M, q′ |= ϕ iff M, q |= KAϕ.
2
Remark 3 The new language is strictly more expressive than ATLir, ATOL etc.: for
example, formula EAEA〈〈A〉〉ϕ cannot be expressed in any of the former logics.
Technical Report IfI-05-10
12 W. Jamroga and T. Ågotnes
3.3 Model Checking
The model checking problem asks whether a given formula ϕ holds in a given model
M and state q. We define general model checking as the problem that asks whether
formula ϕ holds in model M and set of states Q. Let mctl(ϕ,M) be a CTL model
checker that returns the set of all states that satisfy ϕ in M. Below, we sketch algo-
rithm mcheck(ϕ,M,Q) that returns “yes” if M,Q |= ϕ and “no” otherwise, running in
nondeterministic polynomial time.
• Cases ϕ ≡ p, ϕ ≡ ¬ψ, ϕ ≡∼ ψ, ϕ ≡ ψ1 ∧ ψ2, ϕ ≡ KAψ: straightforward
(proceed as usually).
• Case ϕ ≡ KˆAψ: return mcheck(ψ,M, img(Q,∼KA )).
• Case ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉
5
ψ: run mcheck(ψ,M, q) for every q ∈ St, and label the states
in which the answer was “yes” with an additional proposition yes (not used else-
where). Then, guess the strategy of A, and “trim” model M by removing all the
transitions inconsistent with the strategy (yielding a sparser model M′). Return
“yes” iff Q′ ⊆ mctl(A
5
yes,M). [For other temporal operators: analogous.]
Note that all the relevant strategies can be guessed beforehand, as a single complex
(but still polynomial) witness (cf. [8]), which gives us the following result:
Theorem 4 General model checking for our logic is NP-complete in the size of the
model and the formula.
4 Negation, Disjunction and Knowledge
The semantic role of constructive knowledge operators is to produce sets of states
that will appear on the left hand side of the satisfaction relation. In a way, these
modalities “aggregate” states into sets, and sets into bigger sets. On the other hand,
most of the other operators “split” (or “destroy”) sets in the sense that, for evaluating
M,Q |= ϕ, they require evaluation of subformulae of ϕ in single states rather than
sets of states. Standard epistemic operators (CA,EA,DA) and strong negation (proposed
in Section 4.1) are the most straightforward examples (e.g., evaluating CAψ in M,Q
“splits” into evaluating ψ in each state from img(Q,∼CA) separately). Cooperation
modalities (combined with temporal operators) are “splitting” in a similar way. Be-
sides the “aggregating” and “splitting” operators, there are also “neutral” ones that do
not change the set of reference: namely, conjunction (∧) and weak negation (¬). Below,




4.1 Strong Negation and Weak Disjunction
We observe that the semantics of negation presented in Section 3.1 (we call it weak
negation throughout the rest of the paper) yields a very strong notion of disjunction
(and a very weak notion of material implication), as the following proposition states.
Proposition 5
1. M,Q |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff M,Q |= ϕ1 or M,Q |= ϕ2
2. M,Q |= ϕ1 → ϕ2 iff M,Q |= ϕ1 implies M,Q |= ϕ2.
Proof.
1. M,Q |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff M,Q |= ¬(¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2) iff M,Q 6|= ¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2 iff M,Q 6|=
¬ϕ1 or M,Q 6|= ¬ϕ2 iff M,Q |= ϕ1 or M,Q |= ϕ2.
2. Straightforward from the above.
2
Such a strong notion of disjunction makes sense when we talk about agents’ abilities,
i.e. when used inside a Ka operator. For example: M, q |= Ka(〈〈A〉〉ϕ ∨ 〈〈A〉〉ψ) means
that A in q can either identify a plan to achieve ϕ or to achieve ψ. On the other hand, for
a disjunction of simpler formulae (e.g. primitive propositions), a weaker notion seems
more intuitive: the disjunction should hold in M,Q iff, for any state from Q, at least one
of the disjuncts holds (but different disjuncts may hold in different states of Q). To this
end, we extend our language with another negation operator ∼, which we call strong or
constructive negation, with the following semantics:
M,Q |=∼ϕ iff M, q 6|= ϕ for every q ∈ Q;
Strong negation defines a weak notion of disjunction, and a strong notion of material
implication:
ϕ1 ‖ ϕ2 ≡ ∼(∼ϕ1∧ ∼ϕ2)
ϕ2  ϕ2 ≡ ∼ϕ1 ‖ ϕ2
Proposition 6
1. M,Q |= ϕ1 ‖ ϕ2 iff ∀q∈QM, q |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2
2. M,Q |= ϕ1  ϕ2 iff ∀q∈QM, q |= ϕ1 → ϕ2
Proof.
1. M,Q |=∼ (∼ϕ1∧ ∼ϕ2) iff ∀q∈QM, q 6|=∼ϕ1∧ ∼ϕ2 iff ∀q∈QM, q 6|=∼ϕ1 or
M, q 6|=∼ϕ2 iff ∀q∈QM, q |= ϕ1 or M, q |= ϕ2 iff ∀q∈QM, q |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2.
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2. M,Q |= ϕ1  ϕ2 iff M,Q |=∼ ϕ1 ‖ ϕ2 iff ∀q∈QM, q |=∼ ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff
∀q∈Q(M, q |=∼ ϕ1 or M, q |= ϕ2) iff ∀q∈Q(M, q 6|= ϕ1 or M, q |= ϕ2 iff
∀q∈QM, q |= ϕ1 → ϕ2.
2
For validity (not strong validity), the two negations, the two disjunctions and the two
implications coincide (the proof is immediate from the propositions above):
Proposition 7 The following are valid (not strongly valid):
1. ¬ϕ↔∼ϕ
2. (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)↔ (ϕ1 ‖ ϕ2)
3. (ϕ1 → ϕ2)↔ (ϕ1  ϕ2)
Note that the ∼ operator does not behave as classical negation: it does not obey
the law of double negation under strong validity (although the law holds with respect
to weak validity by Proposition 7.1). Nevertheless, it preserves the law of excluded
middle and the consistency requirement.
Proposition 8
1. ∼∼ϕ↔ ϕ is not strongly valid.
2. ϕ ‖∼ϕ is strongly valid.
3. ∼(ϕ∧ ∼ϕ) is strongly valid.
Proof.
1. Counterexample: ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉ψ. Then M,Q |= ϕ iff A have one successful strategy
for all q ∈ Q, and M,Q |=∼∼ϕ ⇔ ∀q∈QM,Q |= ϕ iff a have one strategy per
each q ∈ Q.
2. M,Q |= ϕ ‖∼ϕ iff M,Q |=∼ (∼ϕ∧ ∼∼ϕ) iff ∀q∈Q(M, q 6|=∼ϕ∧ ∼∼ϕ) iff
∀q∈Q(M, q |= ϕ or M, q 6|= ϕ).
3. M,Q |=∼ (ϕ∧ ∼ϕ) iff ∀q∈Q(M, q 6|= ϕ∧ ∼ϕ) iff ∀q∈Q(M, q 6|= ϕ or M, q |=
ϕ).
2
Finally, a minor remark. We have considered two possible operators for negation.
There is a third one which looks quite natural: M,Q |= ∠ϕ⇔ ∃q∈QM, q 6|= ϕ, and can
be investigated in the future.
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4.2 Properties of Constructive Knowledge
In the following proposition we list some properties of constructive knowledge (keep in
mind that strong validity implies validity).
Proposition 9 The following are strongly valid:
1. Ka(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)↔ (Kaϕ1 ∨Kaϕ2)
2. Ka¬ϕ↔ ¬Kaϕ
3. Ka(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)↔ (Kaϕ1 ∧Kaϕ2)
4. Ka(ϕ1 → ϕ2)↔ (Kaϕ1 → Kaϕ2)
Proof.
1. M,Q |= Ka(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) iff M, img(Q,∼a) |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff M, img(Q,∼a) |= ϕ1 or
M, img(Q,∼a) |= ϕ2 iff M,Q |= Kaϕ1 or M,Q |= Kaϕ2 iff M,Q |= Kaϕ1 ∨
Kaϕ2.
2. M,Q |= Ka¬ϕ iff M, img(Q,∼a) |= ¬ϕ iff M, img(Q,∼a) 6|= ϕ iff M,Q 6|= Kaϕ
iff M,Q |= ¬Kaϕ.
3. M,Q |= Kaϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff M, img(Q,∼a) |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff M, img(Q,∼a) |= ϕ1 and
M, img(Q,∼a) |= ϕ2 iff M,Q |= Kaϕ1 and M,Q |= Kaϕ2 iff M,Q |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2.
4. M,Q |= Ka(¬ϕ1∨ϕ2) iff M,Q |= (Ka¬ϕ1)∨Kaϕ2 iff M,Q |= (¬Kaϕ1)∨Kaϕ2
iff M,Q |= Kaϕ1 → Kaϕ2.
2
Furthermore, it turns out that standard knowledge is definable by constructive knowl-
edge and strong negation:
Theorem 10 Kaϕ↔ Ka∼∼ϕ is strongly valid.
Proof. M,Q |= Ka∼∼ϕ iff M, img(Q,∼a) |=∼∼ϕ iff ∀q′∈img(Q,∼a)M, q′ 6|=∼ϕ iff
∀q′∈img(Q,∼a)M, q′ |= ϕ iff M,Q |= Kaϕ. 2
Theorem 10 shows that, when we have strong negation in the language, standard
knowledge is a special case of constructive knowledge.
4.2.1 Is Ka an Epistemic Operator?
Do the S5 properties of knowledge hold for constructive knowledge? It might depend
on the whether we use weak or strong implication and negation, but in both cases the
answer is no. Particularly, the truth axiom does not hold. Also, the version of the K
axiom with strong implication does not hold.
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Theorem 11 Below, we list the constructive knowledge versions of the S5 properties
(plus some other properties) with weak implication/negation, and with strong implica-
tion/negation. “Yes” means that the schema is strongly valid; “No” means that it is not
even weakly valid (incidentally, none of the properties turned out to be weakly but not
strongly valid). While the truth axiom does not hold, we observe that the introspection
axioms can be strengthen to equivalences.
K Ka(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kaϕ→ Kaψ) Yes eK Ka(ϕ ψ) (Kaϕ Kaψ) No
D Kaϕ→ ¬Ka¬ϕ Yes eD Kaϕ ∼Ka∼ϕ No
D
+
Kaϕ↔ ¬Ka¬ϕ Yes eD+ Kaϕ↔∼Ka∼ϕ No
T Kaϕ→ ϕ No eT Kaϕ ϕ No
4 Kaϕ→ KaKaϕ Yes e4 Kaϕ KaKaϕ Yes
4
+
Kaϕ↔ KaKaϕ Yes e4+ Kaϕ KaKaϕ Yes
5 ¬Kaϕ→ Ka¬Kaϕ Yes e5 ∼Kaϕ Ka∼Kaϕ Yes
5
+
¬Kaϕ↔ Ka¬Kaϕ Yes e5+ ∼Kaϕ Ka∼Kaϕ Yes
B ϕ→ Ka¬Ka¬ϕ No eB ϕ Ka∼Ka∼ϕ No
Before proving Theorem 11, we establish an intermediate result.
Lemma 12
1. There is a model M, state q, agent a and formula ϕ such that M, img(q,∼a) |=
ϕ and M, q 6|= ϕ.
2. There is a model M, state q, agent a and formula ϕ such that M, img(q,∼a) 6|=
ϕ and M, q |= ϕ.
Proof.
1. Let ϕ = ¬p, where p is a primitive proposition, and let M be a model with two
states q, q′ such that q ∼a q′, pi(q) = {p} and pi(q′) = ∅. p 6∈ pi(q) ∩ pi(q′);
M, {q, q′} 6|= p; M, img(q,∼a) |= ϕ. But p ∈ pi(q), so M, q |= p; M, q 6|= ϕ.
2. Let M be as above, and let ϕ = p. p ∈ pi(q), so M, q |= ϕ. But p 6∈ pi(q)∩ pi(q′),
so M, img(q,∼a) 6|= ϕ.
2
Proof. [of Theorem 11]
4
+/4: M,Q |= KaKaϕ iff M, img(Q,∼a) |= Kaϕ iff M, img(img(Q,∼a),∼a) |= ϕ
iff M, img(Q,∼a) |= ϕ (since img(img(Q,∼a),∼a) = img(Q,∼a)) iff M,Q |=
Kaϕ.
K: Immediate by Proposition 9.
T: Let M, q, a, ϕ be as in Lemma 12.1. M, q |= Kaϕ, but M, q 6|= ϕ, so T is not weakly




+/5: M,Q |= ¬Kaϕ iff M,Q 6|= Kaϕ iff, by 4+, M,Q 6|= KaKaϕ iff, by Proposition
9, M,Q |= Ka¬Kaϕ.
D
+/D: M,Q |= Kaϕ iff M,Q |= ¬¬Kaϕ iff, by Proposition 9, M,Q |= ¬Ka¬ϕ.
B: Let M, q, a, ϕ be as in Lemma 12.2. M, img(q,∼a) 6|= ϕ, so M, q |= Ka¬ϕ. By
4
+
, M, q |= KaKa¬ϕ, so M, q 6|= ¬KaKa¬ϕ, and by Proposition 9 M, q 6|=
Ka¬Ka¬ϕ. But M, q |= ϕ. Thus, B is not weakly (and hence not strongly) valid.
K˜: We construct a counterexample. Let M be a model with states q1, q2 and agent a,
such that q1 ∼a q2, pi(q1) = {r} and pi(q2) = {p}. Let ϕ = ¬p and ψ = r. p 6∈
pi(q1) ∩ pi(q2), so M, img(q1,∼a) |= ¬ϕ and M, q1 |= Kϕ. r 6∈ pi(q1) ∩ pi(q2),
so M, img(q1,∼a) 6|= ψ and M, q1 6|= Kaψ. Thus, M, q1 6|= Kaϕ → Kaψ and
by Proposition 7: M, q1 6|= Kaϕ  Kaψ (*). Since both M, q1 |= ϕ → ψ
and M, q2 |= ϕ → ψ, by Proposition 6, M, img(q1,∼a) |= ϕ  ψ and thus
M, q1 |= Ka(ϕ  ψ). Together with (*), we get that M, q1 6|= Ka(ϕ  ψ) →
(Kaϕ  Kaψ) and, by Proposition 7, M, q1 6|= Ka(ϕ  ψ)  (Kaϕ  Kaψ).
Thus, K˜ is not weakly (and hence not strongly) valid.
T˜: Let M, q, a, ϕ be as in Lemma 12.1. M, q |= Kaϕ and M, q 6|= ϕ, so M, q 6|= Kaϕ 
ϕ by Proposition 7. Thus, T˜ is not weakly (and hence not strongly) valid.
4˜
+/4˜: M,Q |= Kaϕ  KaKaϕ iff, by Proposition 6, ∀q∈Q(M, q |= Kaϕ ⇔ M, q |=
KaKaϕ) iff, by 4+, ∀q∈Q(M, q |= Kaϕ↔ M, q |= Kaϕ).
5˜
+/5˜: M,Q |=∼ Kaϕ  Ka ∼ Kaϕ iff, by Proposition 6, ∀q∈Q(M, q |=∼ Kaϕ ⇔
M, q |= Ka ∼ ϕ) iff ∀q∈Q(M, img(q,∼a) 6|= ϕ ⇔ M, img(q,∼a) |=∼ ϕ) iff
∀q∈Q(M, img(q,∼a) 6|= ϕ ⇔ ∀q′∈img(q,∼a)M, img(q′,∼a) 6|= ϕ) which is true,
since img(q′,∼a) = img(q,∼a) for any q′ ∈ img(q,∼a).
D˜: M, q |= Kaϕ  ∼ Ka ∼ ϕ iff M, img(q,∼a) |= ϕ ⇒ M, q |=∼ Ka ∼ ϕ iff
M, img(q,∼a) |= ϕ ⇒ M, q 6|= Ka ∼ ϕ iff M, img(q,∼a) |= ϕ ⇒
M, img(q,∼a) 6|=∼ ϕ iff M, img(q,∼a) |= ϕ ⇒ ∀q′ ∈ img(q,∼a)M, q′ |= ϕ.
Let M, q, a, ϕ be as in Lemma 12.1, and let q′ = q. M, img(q,∼a) |= ϕ but
M, q′ 6|= ϕ. Thus, D˜ is not weakly (and hence not strongly) valid.
B˜: M, q |= ϕ  Ka ∼ Ka ∼ ϕ iff M, q |= ϕ ⇒ M, img(q,∼a) |=∼ Ka ∼ ϕ iff
M, q |= ϕ ⇒ ∀q′∈img(q,∼a)M, q′ |= Ka ∼ ϕ iff M, q |= ϕ ⇒ ∀q′∈img(q,∼a)
M, img(q′,∼a) |=∼ ϕ iff M, q |= ϕ ⇒ ∀q′∈img(q,∼a)∀q′′∈img(q′,∼a)M, q′′ |= ϕ
iff M, q |= ϕ ⇒ ∀q′∈img(q,∼a)M, q′ |= ϕ. Let M, q, a, ϕ be as in Lemma 12.2.
q ∈ img(q,∼a) but M, img(q,∼a) 6|= ϕ. But M, q |= ϕ. Thus, B˜ is not weakly
(and hence not strongly) valid.
2
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4.2.2 In Quest for the Truth Axiom
We have just showed that, out of the S5 properties, axioms K,D,4,5 (but not T!) hold
wrt weak negation, while only 4,5 hold for constructive negation.
However, it also turns out that if we restrict the language so that a constructive knowl-
edge operator is not immediately followed by weak negation nor conjunction operator,
then the corresponding T axiom of both types of negation becomes strongly valid. Let
L− be the subset of our logical language in which operators CA,EA,DA are never im-
mediately followed by neither ¬ nor ∧.4
Theorem 13 Every L− instance of schema T (i.e., Kaϕ→ ϕ), and every L− instance
of schema T˜ (Kaϕ ϕ) are strongly valid.
Proof.
(T) Note that M,Q |= Kaϕ → ϕ iff M,Q |= Kaϕ ⇒ M,Q |= ϕ (Proposition 5).
Let M,Q |= Kaϕ and Q′ = img(Q,∼a), then M,Q′ |= ϕ. Note that Q ⊆ Q′
(because all ∼KˆA are reflexive). Thus: (1) for ϕ ≡ p or ϕ beginning with a
“splitting” operator, we have M,Q |= ϕ immediately (because then the satisfac-
tion in Q “splits” to satisfaction in for each q ∈ Q, and vice versa); (2) for
ϕ ≡ Kˆ1B1 ...Kˆ
nBnψ, where ψ begins with a “splitting” operator: let IMG(R) =
img(img(...img(R,∼Kˆ1B1 ), ...),∼
Kˆn
Bn ). Then M, IMG(Q′) |= ψ and IMG(Q) ⊆
IMG(Q′), which implies that M, IMG(Q) |= ψ, so M,Q |= ϕ.
(T˜) Note that ∀q∈QM, q |= Kaϕ → ϕ (by T), which implies that M,Q |= Kaϕ  ϕ
(by Proposition 6).
2
Thus, both versions of the T axioms hold for L−. It might be argued that these
weaker versions of T are more appropriate properties of constructive knowledge than
the full truth axioms, since the semantics of e.g. (weak) negation immediately following
a constructive knowledge operator is different from the semantics of negation follow-
ing a traditional knowledge operator. Note that, by Proposition 9, the meaning of weak
negation or conjunction in the immediate scope of a constructive knowledge operator
is the same as if the operator was immediately outside the constructive knowledge op-
erator. Corresponding results can also be shown for the C,D,E operators (the proof is
essientially the same as for Proposition 9). In other words, every formula in our full
logical language is equivalent to one in L−. Thus, we can restrict the logical language
to L− without loosing expressive power. Appearently we then “get” the T axiom (i.e.,
if we take L− to be the logical language), but it must be noted that even though the
two languages are expressively equivalent, the extension of the schema T is different in
4In fact, it is enough to require that, between every occurence of constructive knowledge (CA, EA, DA)
and weak negation (¬), there is always at least one operator other than ∧.
INSTITUT FÜR INFORMATIK
CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE 19
L− and the full language (for example, Ka¬p → ¬p is a full language instance of T,
but even though it is equivalent to the L− formula ¬Kap → ¬p the latter is not a L−
instance of T). Consequently, the axiom schemata K, D and 5 cannot be written as in
Theorem 11, but they can still be expressed with equivalent formulae.
Moreover, it is hard to pinpoint intuitive meaning of weak negation following im-
mediately constructive knowledge: note that e.g. Ka¬〈〈a〉〉ϕ should be read as “a has
constructive knowledge about being unable to achieve ϕ”. (Ka〈〈a〉〉¬ϕ, on the other
hand, makes perfect sense: it refers to a’s constructive ability to prevent ϕ.) To sum
up the discussion about T (and T˜), it seems, first, that the weaker versions given in
Theorem 13 are more proper for constructive knowledge, and second, that it might be
a good idea to consider the logical language for our logic of constructive knowledge to
be limited to L−.
4.3 Expressing Weak Negation via Strong Negation
It seems worth pointing out that, if we are interested only in weak (initial) validity of
formulae (i.e. we want to evaluate the formulae in single states; note, though, that this
may require evaluation of subformulae in sets of states), weak negation (¬) is not really
necessary in the language. The reasons are as follows:
• We have already argued that ‖/∼ are more natural as the disjunction/negation
operators in the propositional case.
• Strong negation (∼) is sufficient to define Ka from Ka.
• Basically, we want to initially evaluate the truth of a formula with respect to a
single state. The only circumstance in which we have to evaluate a subformula
with respect to a set of states, is when it occurs within the scope of a Ka operator
(or a CA,DA,EA operator). But according to Proposition 9 (and corresponding
results for the C,D,E operators), we can move all ¬ and ∧ operators outside that
scope. Thus, we never need to evaluate them with respect to a non-singular set.
By Proposition 7, the interpretation of ¬ and ∧ in a single state is the same as the
interpretation of ∼and ‖. For instance:
M, q |= Ka(〈〈A〉〉0ϕ ∨ 〈〈A〉〉0ψ)⇔ (by Prop. 9)
M, q |= Ka〈〈A〉〉0ϕ ∨Ka〈〈A〉〉0ϕ⇔ (by Prop. 7)
M, q |= Ka〈〈A〉〉0ϕ ‖ Ka〈〈A〉〉0ϕ.
• For subformulae “directly” inside a cooperation modality, the strong/weak oper-
ators also coincide since cooperation modalities split sets of states. For example,
(Ka〈〈A〉〉0¬ϕ)↔ (Ka〈〈A〉〉0 ∼ϕ) is valid.
We have argued informally that weak negation does not add to the expressiveness
with respect to (weak) validity. A full formal treatment of this, and related questions,
is going to be reported in a future work.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a non-standard semantics for the modal logic of strategic abil-
ity under incomplete information, in which formulae are interpreted over sets of states
rather than single states. We also propose new epistemic operators for “constructive”
knowledge. It turns out that, in this new semantics, simple cooperation modalities 〈〈A〉〉
can be combined with “constructive” epistemic operators into sufficiently expressive
formulae. Indeed, the new logic is strictly more expressive than most existing ATL ver-
sions for incomplete information, while it retains the same model checking complexity
as the least costly of them. The philosophical dimension of constructive knowledge is
also natural: the constructive knowledge operators capture the notion of knowing “de
re”, while the standard epistemic operators refer to knowing “de dicto”. Moreover, it
turns out that standard (traditional) knowledge can be expressed through a combination
of constructive knowledge and a negation operator that we call “strong” negation.
We argue that, if we are ultimately only interested in (weak) validity (i.e., traditional
satisfaction in single states), then the weak negation operator is redundant. Moreover,
most of the usual S5 properties hold (with the notable exception of the truth axiom
T), and if we restrict the syntax so that constructive knowledge is never immediately
followed by a “neutral” operator, we do not lose expressive power and the schema T
becomes a validity.
We believe that we have finally obtained a satisfying logic of agents’ strategies un-
der uncertainty, and at the same time came up with novel, meaningful epistemic opera-
tors that capture important properties of the interaction between knowledge, action and
ability. In future work, we plan to investigate further the expressive power of various
operators in our semantics.
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